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INTRODUCTION

The 2011 United States Supreme Court decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health
Inc. is an important statement on how the current Court analyzes laws that
restrict commercial speech, even in the name of protecting patients' medical
privacy. At issue in Sorrell was a Vermont law that would have limited the
ability of pharmaceutical companies to purchase certain physicianidentifiable prescription data (PI data) without the affirmative consent of the
prescriber.' Data mining companies, such as IMS Health Inc., collect this
information about physician prescribing habits and sell it to pharmaceutical
companies, which, in turn, use it to tailor their marketing solicitations to
physicians to promote their brand-name products.2
Vermont's Prescription Confidentiality Law 3, enacted in 2007, would
have substantially restricted the purchase and sale of PI data without the
express permission of the prescriber. The law's stated purpose was
Marcia M. Boumil, M.A., M.S., J.D., LL.M, Associate Professor of Public Health and
Community Medicine and Assistant Dean for Conflicts of Interest Administration at Tufts
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1. VT. STAT. ANN. tit.18, § 4631(d) (2009), invalidated by Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
2. David Orentlicher, Prescription Data Mining and the Protection of Patients'
Interests, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 74, 75 (2010). Pharmaceutical companies routinely send
"detailers" to physicians' offices to provide information concerning the company's new drug
products. Id. While most physicians recognize that detailers are primarily engaged to
promote a company's product, many also rely upon them to learn about new pharmaceuticals
on the market. Id. at 75-76.
3. VT. STAT. ANN. tit.18, § 4631(d) (2009).
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threefold: to protect the privacy of medical information; to promote public
health by ensuring that prescription decisions are based on scientific
evidence, rather than one-sided marketing pitches; and to help contain
health care costs by encouraging prescription of cheaper, generic drugs.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Vermont law
represented a legitimate, common-sense program intended to regulate PI
data or a brazen attempt to suppress commercial speech when the message
was disfavored by the state.5 The decision ultimately hinged on what level
of First Amendment scrutiny the Supreme Court would apply to the
Vermont law.
Imagine you are a pharmaceutical representative ("detailer") seeking to
market your company's new, brand-name antidepressant to an individual
community psychiatrist targeted by your sales force.6 There are eleven
competing products on the market, including a number of less expensive,
generic labels. To assist your sales effort, your company has purchased
proprietary data telling you that this psychiatrist has prescribed your
company's product eight percent of the time over the past twelve months
and a particular competitor's product (brand-name or generic) twenty-three
percent of the time. For this particular sales call, you assemble data, which
is usually company-generated sales data, not peer-reviewed professional
literature (unless it happens to support your marketing goals) that favorably
compares your company's product to the product that was this physician's
choice twenty-three percent of the time. Is such a marketing scheme
ethical? Is it a violation of patient privacy? Should the purchase of such
information be protected as commercial speech? These were the questions
that confronted the Sorrell Court in 2011.
The Prescription Confidentiality Law limited, but did not prohibit, the
purchase and sale of PI data used to promote the marketing of prescription
drugs.7 If the prescriber consented to the sale or use of the PI data (the socalled "opt-in" feature), the restriction would not apply.8 Further, the law
contained a number of other exceptions to the restriction, including use for
scientific research, compliance issues, pharmacy reimbursement, and other
purposes provided by law. 9
Part I of this paper explains the practice of data mining in the
4. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2661 (2011) (discussing Vermont's
legislative findings).
5. Id.
6. The hypothetical describes a process known as "detailing" due to the fact that the
pharmaceutical representatives provide "details" on the various prescriptions they are
selling. See IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 71 (1st Cir. 2008).
7. VT. STAT. ANN. tit.18, § 4631(d) (2009).
8. Id.
9. Id. §463 1(e).
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pharmaceutical context and examines the role of PI data in direct-tophysician marketing, or detailing, of pharmaceutical products. Part II
examines the state laws designed to curb access to PI data that would
eventually divide the First and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals, leading to
review by the United States Supreme Court. Parts III and IV review the
lower courts' opinions, including the split in the federal circuits, the
Supreme Court's grant of certiorari, and the oral arguments considering the
constitutionality of the Vermont law. Part V examines the Supreme Court's
opinion striking down the Vermont law primarily on the basis that it
amounts to an unconstitutional infringement of protected commercial
speech. Part VI examines the implications of the Supreme Court's decision
and provides suggestions for revising state laws to make them consistent
with the Court's ruling.
I.

BACKGROUND: How DOES DATA MINING WORK?

Every year, physicians in the U.S. write nearly four billion prescriptions,
which is an average of twelve scripts for every American.o According to
IMS Health 2009 figures, pharmaceutical manufacturers devoted
approximately $6.3 billion to marketing prescription drugs to physicians,
which is nearly twice as much as the pharmaceutical industry spent on
research and development.12 The industry employs more than 90,000 drug
representatives' 3 and spends upwards of $20,000 per physician per year to
pitch its products.14 Reportedly, there is "one drug representative for every
four to five physicians in the [U.S.]." 5 One attractive tool that drug
companies currently have in their arsenal is access to pre-packaged
information, PI data that indicates which physicians may be suitable
candidates for the marketing of a particular brand-name drug based upon
their prescribing patterns and/or certain characteristics of the patients they
10. Janet Lundy, PrescriptionDrug Trends, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 1, 3 (May
2010), http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/3057-08.pdf.
11. Natasha Singer, A Fight Over How Drugs Are Pitched, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2011,
at B1, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/business/25privacy.html?Page
wanted=all.
12. Big PharmaSpends More On Advertising Than Research And Development, Study
Finds, SCIENCEDAILY (Jan. 7, 2008), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/01
/080105140107.htm.
13. Fact Sheet: Prescription Data Mining, THE PRESCRIPTION PROJECT, 1 (Nov. 19,
2008), http://www.prescriptionproject.org/tools/initiatives factsheets/files/0004.pdf
[hereinafter PRESCRIPTION PROJECT].
14. This figure includes perks such as gifts, meals, and travel, as well as consultancy
fees and continuing medical education (CME) programs. Joshua Weiss, Note, Medical
Marketing in the United States: A Prescriptionfor Reform, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 260, 261
(2010).
15. IMS Health Corp. v. Rowe, 532 F. Supp. 2d 153, 159 (D. Me. 2007).
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serve, such as gender and age. 16
The data mining process begins with so-called health information
organizations (data mining companies or data vendors) that purchase
information collected by pharmacies, including the prescriber's name; the
name, dosage, and quantity of the drug prescribed; the date and place the
prescription was filled; and the patient's age and sex.' 7 Although patient
names are encrypted, each patient is assigned a unique identifier, thereby
allowing data mining companies to link prescriptions and physicians to
individual patients and thus track prescribing patterns over time.18 The
American Medical Association (AMA) also plays a key role in the data
mining process by selling lists of physicians from its "Physician Masterfile"
to these data vendors.19 Data mining companies then match up the bundled
information from pharmacy records with the identities on the AMA's
physician lists to create individual prescriber profiles.20
After aggregating this information, data mining companies such as IMS
Health then license the PI data to pharmaceutical companies, whose
representatives use it to develop, monitor, and/or adapt their targeted
marketing strategies to boost drug sales. 2' In fact, data vendors tout the
availability of PI data as a way for pharmaceutical companies to "gain a
level of insight that allows them to predict and influence physicianprescribing behavior like never before." 2 2 Pharmaceutical companies have
taken advantage of this new insight, exponentially increasing their spending
on direct-to-physician marketing since the advent of PI data in this form.23
Notwithstanding pharmaceutical companies' claims that data mining is
necessary to ensure that physicians learn about the latest, most effective
drugs for their patients, the practice has been heavily criticized for what it
is: strategic marketing. 24 Furthermore, critics have cited a connection
16. Id. at 158-59.
17. Gregory D. Curfman, et al., Prescriptions,Privacy, and the First Amendment, 364
NEW ENG. J.MED. 2053, 2053 (2011).
18. Id.
19. PRESCRIPTION PROJECT, supra note 13, at 3 (stating that the sale of Masterfile
information to data vendors provides a significant stream of revenue for the AMA - "$44.5
million in 2005" alone). See also Jennifer L. Klocke, PrescriptionRecordsfor Sale: Privacy
and Free Speech Issues Arisingfrom the Sale of De-identfied Medical Data, 44 IDAHO L.
REv. 511, 514 (2008) (stating "the AMA earns $40 million per year selling [PI-data] about
the nation's doctors").
20.

PRESCRIPTION PROJECT, supra note 13, at 2.

21. Brief for Petitioners at 8-9, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (No.
10-779).
22. Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of its Objection to Plaintiffs Motion
for Preliminary Injunction at 13, IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F.Supp.2d 163 (D.N.H.
2007) (No. 06-CV-280-PB).
23. IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 631 F.Supp.2d 434, 442 (D. Vt. 2009).
24. See Brief of AARP & The Nat'l Legislative Ass'n on Prescription Drug Prices as

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol21/iss2/7

4

Boumil et al.: Prescription Data Mining, Medical Privacy and the First Amendment

2012]

Prescription Data Mining

451

between the collection and sale of PI data and both a detrimental impact on
public health and a rise in prescription drug costs. 2 5 Data mining and the
sales-focused marketing tactics it fosters have been linked to overprescription of newer, costlier drugs with little-known side effects that, in
fact, may have no demonstrable benefit over existing brand-name or generic
choices. 26 Ample evidence of inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading
statements made in the course of pharmaceutical marketing only heightens
the concern that data mining may lead to irrational over-prescription of new
and expensive medications that carry increased risks of patient harm.27
Research reveals that the quality of prescribing decisions decreases as
more physicians rely upon information from pharmaceutical sales
representatives.28 For example, a seminal study in the mid-1990s concluded
that eleven percent of observed statements made by drug company
salespeople to doctors were clearly false, despite the fact that only twentysix percent of physicians detected such erroneous messages.29 Another
significant study found that after interactions with sales representatives,
physicians, while claiming to have changed their prescribing behavior
based on scientific data, actually wrote more prescriptions consistent with
the promotional claims of the sales representatives.30
The marketing leverage that data mining affords pharmaceutical
companies vis-d-vis physicians also drives up health care costs as
physicians shift to prescribing these more expensive drugs for their patients.
Physicians' reliance on false or misleading representations about the safety
and effectiveness of particular drugs may also lead them to prescribe new
products for inappropriate, off-label uses, saddling public programs, private
health plans, and consumers with the associated costs." Finally, given that
low-income individuals and/or seniors are often forced to make decisions
about whether to adhere to a medication regimen based upon cost, higher
prescription drug prices may drive up overall health care spending through
increased hospitalizations and complications that eventually result from the

Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8, Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (No. 10-779)
[hereinafter Brief of AARP & NLARxAss'n].
25. See Brief of AARP & NLARxAss'n, supra note 24, at 24-25.
26. Brief of AARP & NLARxAss'n, supra note 24, at 24-25.
27. Brief of AARP & NLARxAss'n, supra note 24, at 24-25.
28. David Orentlicher, Prescription Data Mining and the Protection of Patients'
Interests, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 74, 76 (2010).
29. Michael G. Ziegler et al., The Accuracy of Drug Informationfrom Pharmaceutical
Sales Representatives, 273 JAMA 1296, 1296 (1995).
30. Orentlicher, supra note 28, at 76.
31. Brief of Amici Curiae AFSCME District Council 37, Health Care for All, and
Community Catalyst in Support of Petitioners at 20, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct.
2653 (2011) (No. 10-779).
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patients' inability to afford necessary medications. 32
Notwithstanding its facilitation of targeted detailing, the AMA reached
an agreement with the data mining companies in 2006 whereby physicians
could "opt out" of having their prescription data shared with pharmaceutical
industry representatives.33 However, the effectiveness of this offered
solution depends upon physicians knowing that their prescribing habits are
monitored and used as a marketing tool by the pharmaceutical companies.
In 2002, approximately one-third of physicians studied were unaware that
drug industry representatives receive information about their prescribing
historieS34 and many reportedly were "shocked" upon learning that
pharmacies sell such information to data vendors without their consent.3 5
Thus, the issue of allowing one's prescribing data to be available only if the
physician "opts in" (instead of unavailable only if he "opts out") is an
essential point, since most physicians do not respond to notices at all.
The AMA, in an effort to publicize the issue, strongly promoted the
opportunity for physicians to withhold their prescribing information from
data miners through its Prescription Drug Restriction Program (PDRP).3 6
However, current statistics suggest that only about twenty-five percent of
physicians report being aware that this program exists. 37 Furthermore, as of
2010, less than four percent of all physicians have opted out through the
PDRP.38 Finally, pharmaceutical companies may still access the PI data of
the physicians who choose to opt out, even for marketing purposes, so long
as the pharmaceutical companies do not provide the information directly to
detailers.39
The AMA's failure to adequately address the concerns raised by the use
of data mining in direct-to-physician marketing by pharmaceutical
companies was instrumental in spurring individual states to regulate this
practice. The rising costs of pharmaceuticals and evidence of compromised
clinical decision-making support the position that the use of PI data
negatively affects the health care system. Indeed, despite the assertions of
32. Brief of AARP & NLARx as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 24,
at 31, Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (No. 10-779).
33. Stephanie Saul, Federal Court Upholds Drug Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2008, at 10, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/business/19drug.Html
?ref-imshealthinc.

34. National Survey of Physicians: Part II: Doctors and PrescriptionDrugs, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., 3 (March 2002), http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/loader.cfn?url=/commonspot
/security/getfile.cfm&PagelD=13965.
35. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 21, at 13-14, Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (No. 10-779).
36. Orentlicher, supra note 28, at 77-78.
37. Jeremy A. Greene, Pharmaceutical Marketing Research and the Prescribing
Physician, 146 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 742, 746 (2007).
38.

39.

Orentlicher, supra note 28, at 78.
PRESCRIPTION PROJECT, supra note 13, at 3.
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data vendors and pharmaceutical companies that detailing is a valuable
practice for physicians, the evidence simply does not support it.
Furthermore, the AMA's PDRP initiative does not address the concerns of
physicians who are unaware that their prescribing information is being sold
and used in such a manner.
II.

STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES

The state legislative responses to the concerns raised by the use of PI
data for pharmaceutical detailing have been deliberate and comprehensive.
Between 2006 and 2010, twenty-six states proposed legislation that would
limit the use of PI data for commercial/marketing purposes. 40 New
Hampshire was the first to enact such legislation in June 2006, followed
closely by Vermont and Maine, both in June 2007.41 The New Hampshire,
Vermont, and Maine statutes all represent similar efforts to contain the
negative effects of detailing using PI data, but there are important
differences in the way the laws are structured. These three statutes were the
ones reviewed by the First and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals, resulting
in inconsistent appellate rulings and, ultimately, review by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
The New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine laws reflect three primary
interests in limiting commercial use of PI data: protection of public health,
maintenance of physician privacy, and containment of rising health care
costs. 42 The theory behind these statutes is that a ban on the commercial use
of PI data would accomplish each of these goals by addressing the insidious
nature of detailing itself.43 Specifically, protection of public health would be
advanced by focusing physicians' decision-making on medical and
scientific knowledge and by reducing the number of new drugs without
well-documented track records being prescribed with the attendant risk of
potentially dangerous health effects.4 Cost containment would be achieved

40. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 26-27 n.5, Sorrell, v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct.
2653 (No. 10-779). See also Brief for the States of Ill., Ala., Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., Del.,
Ga., Haw., Idaho, Ind., Iowa, Ky., La., Me., Md., Minn., Miss., Mont., Nev., N.H., N.M.,
N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Or., R.I., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Utah, Wash., and W. Va. and
D.C. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8-9, Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (No. 10779).10-779) [hereinafter Amicus Brief for the States].
41. Act of June 30, 2006, ch. 328:1, 2006 N.H. Laws 750, 750-51 (codified at N.H. REV.
STAT ANN. §§ 318:47-f, 318:47-g, 318-B:12(IV) (2006)); Act of June 9, 2007, No. 80, § 17,
2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves 635, 650-53, amended by Act of March 5, 2008, No. 89, § 3, 2008
Vt. Acts & Resolves 5, 5 (codified as amended at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631 (2009));
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711 -E(2-A) (2008).
42. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
4631(a) (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,

43.
44.

§ 1711 -E(1-B)

(2008).

See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711-E(1-A(D)) (2008).
See id.
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through fewer brand-name drugs being prescribed under circumstances
where a generic substitute - or no drug at all - would be equally effective.4 5
To some extent, the goal of prescriber privacy would be advanced simply
through the law's limitation on the dissemination of individual prescribing
information. However, because each statute allows the release of prescriber
data for purposes other than commercial use, the statutes only moderately
limit the actual dissemination of individual physicians' information. The
privacy interest advanced, therefore, is best understood as increasing
prescribers' control over the use of their own prescribing data, rather than
keeping the physicians' data "private" per se.46
Each of the three laws that was reviewed contemplates a similar method
of achieving these goals. None of the laws seeks to ban the practice of
pharmaceutical detailing or even attempts to directly regulate the interaction
between pharmaceutical representatives and physicians. Instead, the statutes
would effectively restrict pharmacies, health insurers, and other similar
entities from disseminating PI data for the sole purpose of advertising,
marketing, or promoting prescription drugs.47 Thus, the statutes would
regulate the dissemination of PI data at its source by preventing pharmacies
and other entities from engaging in specific commercial transactions
without prescriber permission. Each statute expressly allows for the
dissemination of PI data for other purposes, such as pharmacy
reimbursement, care management or utilization review by a health insurer,
or legitimate public health research.4 8
The three laws vary, however, with respect to whether and how PI data
may be disseminated, including for otherwise prohibited purposes. The
New Hampshire law is the most far-reaching as it imposes an absolute ban
on using all "records relative to prescription information containing patientidentifiable and prescriber-identifiable data" for "any commercial
purpose." 4 9 The New Hampshire statute defines "commercial purpose" to
include "advertising, marketing, promotion, or any activity that could be
used to influence sales or market share of a pharmaceutical product,
influence or evaluate the prescribing behavior of an individual health care
professional, or evaluate the effectiveness of a professional pharmaceutical
45.
46.
2010);
(2011)
47.

See id. §§ 1711-E(1-A(D)), 1711-E(1-A(E)).
See id. § 1711 -E(1-B(A)); IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 275-76 (2d Cir.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 11-12, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653
(No. 10-779).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 463 1(d) (2009), invalidated by Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,

131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011); N.H. REV. STAT ANN.

§ 318:47-f

(2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.

22, § 1711 -E(2-A) (2008).
48. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 463 1(e) (2009), invalidatedby Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011); N.H. REV. STAT ANN.

§

318:47-f (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.

22, § 1711-E(1)(F-1) (2008).
49. N.H. REV. STAT ANN. § 318:47-f (2006).
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detailing sales force." 50 Through the use of explicit exemptions, the New
Hampshire law aims to proscribe the transfer of PI data for direct marketing
to physicians while continuing to permit the use of PI data for other
purposes. 5 ' The New Hampshire statute, however, does not give health care
providers the option to either opt in or opt out of the commercial use of
their PI data and, in this way, is the most restrictive of the three laws as
physicians have no control at all.
The Maine law does give health care providers an option and thus is the
least restrictive by way of its "opt-out" mechanism. Through exemptions
and definitions similar to the New Hampshire statute, the Maine statute is
structured to limit the use of PI data for direct marketing to physicians and
52
other prescribers. However, the Maine legislature chose to limit the law's
restriction to "prescription drug information that identifies a prescriber who
has filed for confidentiality protection." The statutory scheme provides the
means by which prescribers may elect to withhold their PI data from being
used for "marketing purposes by carriers, pharmacies and prescription drug
information intermediaries "54
By signing and submitting a "confidentiality protection form" or the
equivalent online procedure, prescribers may elect to opt out, withholding
their PI data from use in direct-to-prescriber marketing. Until a prescriber
affirmatively indicates a desire to protect his or her identifiable information,
the law does not affect the normal course of business between entities
receiving PI data, such as pharmacies, and the pharmaceutical
manufacturers that purchase the data to inform marketing activities.5 6 In
practice, such opt-out provisions have limited utility because the "default,"
which occurs when no individual action is taken, maintains the status quo.
If a Maine prescriber does not act to limit the dissemination of his or her PI
data, the information will continue to be sold to pharmaceutical
manufacturers for use in detailing.
The Vermont law differs here. Whereas the Maine statute offers
prescribers a method to obtain additional confidentiality protection, the
Vermont law is structured as an "opt-in" with respect to the dissemination
of confidential information. The statutory scheme provides that PI data shall
not be transferred "for marketing or promoting a prescription drug, unless

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711-E(2-A) (2008). See also id. § 1711-E(F-1)
(defining the term "marketing").
53. Id. § 1711-E(2-A).
54. Id § 1711-E(4(A)(1)).
55. See id.
56. See id. § 1711-E(2-A).
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the prescriber consents." In other words, the Vermont statute's default
position prohibits the use of PI data for marketing purposes, only allowing
the data to be used toward that end if the prescriber affirmatively so
permits. The practical effect of this opt-in approach is that the breadth of the
Vermont statute's application more closely resembles New Hampshire's
total ban than it does Maine's more limited, opt-out approach. In order for
PI data to be available for pharmaceutical manufacturers to use in
marketing efforts, a physician must give consent after such consent is
solicited through a state-created "prescriber data-sharing program" in which
the state shall "solicit the prescriber's consent on licensing applications or
renewal forms and shall provide a prescriber a method for revoking his or
her consent." 58
The Vermont statute is also unusual in its inclusion of language directly
regulating the pharmaceutical manufacturers and marketers. In addition to
limiting the transfer of PI data by entities such as pharmacies, Vermont's
law states that, "[p]harmaceutical manufacturers and pharmaceutical
marketers shall not use prescriber-identifiable information for marketing or
promoting a prescription drug unless the prescriber consents.," Neither
New Hampshire nor Maine's law contains a comparable provision. It is
unclear exactly what practical effect this provision might have had, other
than the possibility of a civil action against the pharmaceutical
manufacturers, 6 0 because the goal of limiting dissemination of this data may
be wholly achieved by regulating at the point of collection.
This provision did, however, fit squarely within the general character of
the Vermont statute - one that is directly at odds with the goals of
pharmaceutical manufacturers. The Vermont legislature was more explicit
about the harms it believes emanate from the practice of detailing than
either New Hampshire or Maine's legislatures. Recognizing the "strong link
between pharmaceutical marketing activities, health care spending, and the
health of Vermonters," the legislative findings pit the goals of those
marketing programs against the goals of the state. 61 The legislature found
that "progress toward [the aims of marketing programs] comes at the
expense of cost-containment activities and possibly the health of individual
patients." 62 Further elaborating on this dichotomy of interests, the Vermont
legislature found that the "marketplace for ideas on medicine safety and
57. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 463 1(d) (2009), invalidated by Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
58. Id. §4631(c)(1).
59. Id. § 4631(d).
60. Id. §4631(f).
61. Act of June 9, 2007, No. 80, §§ 1(2)-(3), 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves 635, 635
(codified as amended at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 463 1(d) (2009)).
62. Id. § 1(3).
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effectiveness is frequently one-sided" because of the expensive investment
in marketing campaigns for brand-name drugs.63 Accordingly, this results in
"doctors prescribing drugs based on incomplete and biased information."6
Not mincing words, the Vermont legislature found that "[p]ublic health is
ill served by the massive imbalance in information presented to doctors and
other prescribers."65 The language of the Vermont statute was most directly
confrontational to pharmaceutical interests, reflecting the broader concerns
of each of the three states whose laws were challenged on constitutional
grounds.
The three statutes, each emphasizing the substantial interests of public
health, cost containment, and prescriber privacy, reflect novel approaches to
regulating the pharmaceutical industry's impact on physicians' individual
prescribing decisions. The statutes are similar, yet not identical to each
other. The limited scope of the Maine statute stands in contrast to the broad
application of the New Hampshire statute, with the Vermont statute
representing a middle ground. Additionally, Vermont's law is the only one
to directly regulate the pharmaceutical manufacturers and is based upon
pointed criticisms of pharmaceutical marketing practices couched within the
legislative findings.
III.

LEGAL CHALLENGES

Constitutional challenges to the New Hampshire, Maine, and Vermont
statutes quickly followed their enactment. Data mining and pharmaceutical
industry plaintiffs brought a myriad of claims seeking to overturn the states'
restrictions on the use of PI data. As the cases progressed through the lower
courts, and eventually the U.S. Supreme Court, it became apparent that the
First Amendment challenge lay at the heart of determining whether the
statutes would be upheld.66 The various courts approached the First
Amendment analyses in very different ways and, in doing so, paved the
way for rulings that varied significantly.
IMS Health Inc., the largest data mining company, led the charge in
challenging all three statutes. In 2006, when New Hampshire passed its law,
IMS Health's revenues totaled $1.96 billion, a twelve-percent increase from
the previous year.6 7 Almost half of that revenue was attributed to "sales
63. Id. § 1(4).
64. Id.
65. Id. § 1(6).
66. The plaintiffs in IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 434 (D. Vt. 2009),
brought claims relating to different sections of the Vermont statute in addition to the First
Amendment free speech claim, alleging that the statute (1) was unconstitutionally vague, (2)
violated the dormant Commerce Clause, (3) compelled speech in violation of the First
Amendment, (4) violated the Commerce Clause, and (5) was federally preempted.
67. Klocke, supra note 19, at 514.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2012

11

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 21 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 7

Annals of Health Law

458

[Vol. 21
61

force effectiveness," which includes PI data programs. IMS Health's
biggest clients are pharmaceutical companies, whose use of PI data would
have been curtailed to varying degrees under each statute.6 9 In fact, sales to
the pharmaceutical industry accounted for "substantially all" of IMS's
revenue from 2003-2005.70 Verispan, LLC, a smaller but similarly situated
data vendor, joined IMS Health in contesting the New Hampshire law.7 A
separate suit challenging the Vermont statute brought by the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) was consolidated with
the similar IMS Health action. 2 Collectively, the plaintiffs risked lost
revenue and a change in business practices with the implementation of these
three laws.73 For these reasons, the plaintiffs also shared a vested interest in
preventing the implementation of the twenty-six statutes proposed
throughout the U.S. 74 The two U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals that would
eventually review these practices reached very different conclusions. The
First Circuit was first to rule in 2008 and 2010, affirming the validity of the
New Hampshire and Maine statutes, respectively, restricting certain
transfers of physicians' prescription histories for use by pharmaceutical
manufacturers to inform their detailing activities.
A.

IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte

In IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held in the first instance that New Hampshire's Prescription
Information Law76 represented a permissible regulation of conduct, not
speech. Further, to the extent that the New Hampshire statute amounted to
a restriction on commercial speech, the court held that the state "ha[d] acted
with as much forethought and precision as the circumstances permit[ted]
and the Constitution demands" in trying to combat a "novel threat to the

68. Id.
69. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d 163, 166 (D.N.H. 2007).
70. Id. (quoting IMS's 2005 Annual Report).
71. Id at 165; see IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2010).
72. IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 434, 444 (D. Vt. 2009).
73. See Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 173-74 (describing the "substantially altered"
business practices of IMS and Verispan to comply with the restrictions imposed by the New
Hampshire statute); Michael Heesters, An Assault on the Business of PharmaceuticalData
Mining, 11 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 789, 816 (2009).
74. See Brief for Respondent Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. at 25-26, Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (No. 10-779); Brief of Respondents IMS Health Inc.,
Verispan, LLC, & Source Healthcare Analytics, Inc. at 31-32, Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (No.
10-779) [hereinafter Brief of Respondents].
75. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2008); IMS Health, Inc. v.
Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2010).
76. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 318:47-f (2006).
77. Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 45.
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cost-effective delivery of health care."
Ayotte began when two data mining companies sued New Hampshire
alleging that its Prescription Information Law: (1) violated the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, (2) was void for
vagueness, and (3) offended the dormant Commerce Clause.79 Initially, the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire found in favor of
plaintiffs IMS Health and Verispan, declaring the law unconstitutional and
enjoining its enforcement.8 0 Principally, the district court concluded that the
Prescription Information Law regulated "commercial speech" and did not
satisfy the elements of a "permissible commercial speech restriction"
established by the Court in 1980 in the seminal Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission ofNew York.81 With respect to
New Hampshire's asserted interest in cost containment, the district court
emphasized the state's failure to prove that, on balance, non-bioequivalent
generic drugs would be less harmful to the public health than brand-name
drugs or that reduced health care costs could be achieved without
undermining care for the subset of patients who would fare better with the
branded medication. 8 2 Finally, the district court found New Hampshire's
statute was not narrowly tailored to achieve its stated goals. Specifically,
the state had other non-speech-related options to curtail detailing without
restricting protected speech, such as gift bans, counter-detailing, continuing
medical education programs, and alterations to the state's Medicaid

program.83
A majority of the First Circuit overturned that decision, concluding that
the data miners' aggregation, manipulation, and transfer of PI data84 for the
express purpose of facilitating pharmaceutical detailing constituted conduct,
78. Id.
79. Id. at 47-48.
80. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d 163, 183 (D.N.H. 2007).
81. Id. at 176-78. Under this tripartite test, "truthful commercial speech that does not
promote unlawful activity can be limited under Central Hudson only if it: '(1) is in support
of a substantial government interest, (2) directly advances the government interest asserted,
and (3) is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."' Id. at 177 (internal
citation omitted) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
82. Id. at 180-81.
83. Id at 182-83.
84. Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 52. The First Circuit took pains to delineate which of three
interwoven transactions involving PI data should be the subject of its analysis. Id. at 48-50.
Specifically, the court distinguished data miners' acquisition of information from pharmacies
and subsequent sale of processed data to drug companies (i.e., upstream transactions) from
the pharmaceutical detailers' use of that information to advertise particular products to
physicians (i.e., downstream use). Id. at 48-49. Because New Hampshire's statute sought to
regulate the upstream uses - and because the data-miner plaintiffs did not have standing to
assert the interests of pharmaceutical companies, detailers, or physicians - the court resolved
the conduct/speech question with an eye toward the data miners' activities. Id. at 50.
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as opposed to expression.85 To the extent that New Hampshire's statute
infringed upon speech at all, the court found such speech to be of "nugatory
informational value" insofar as it only aimed to increase detailers'
bargaining power vis-A-vis physicians. 86 PI data had simply become a
commodity in an economic transaction that New Hampshire had every right
to regulate.
As the court colorfully noted, "The plaintiffs . . . ask us in essence to rule

that because their product is information instead of, say, beef jerky, any
regulation constitutes a restriction of speech. We think that such an
interpretation stretches the fabric of the First Amendment beyond any
rational measure." 8 Despite IMS Health and Verispan's efforts to portray
themselves as "publishers" collecting and disseminating information of
public concern within the marketplace of ideas, the court recognized that
New Hampshire's law still left data mining companies free to transfer the
aggregated information to any entity for non-detailing purposes. 8 9 The fact
that the statute rendered it less profitable for the plaintiffs to compile PI
data had no significance for purposes of First Amendment protection. 90
As an alternative basis for upholding the Prescription Information Law,
the court found that the statute survived intermediate scrutiny as a
regulation of commercial speech. 9 1 While New Hampshire had articulated
three state interests served by the law - preserving patient and prescriber
privacy, protecting public health, and containing health care costs - the
court confined its analysis to the latter. 92 Cost containment easily qualified
as a substantial state interest, although it was less clear that the statute
promised to directly advance that goal. Ultimately, the court believed New

85. Id. at 51 (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62
(2006)) ("[I]t has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make
a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or
carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.").
86. Id. at 52, 54.
87. Id. at 54.
88. Id. at 53.
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting Wine & Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 418 F.3d 36, 48 (1st Cir.
2005)) ("The First Amendment's core concern is with the free transmission of a message or
idea from speaker to listener, not with the speaker's ability to turn a profit.").
91. Id. at 54. The data-miner plaintiffs argued that transactions involving PI data should
be construed as fully protected speech, since such activities do not "'propos[e] a commercial
transaction."' Id (quoting Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74
(1989)). However, the majority rejected that interpretation and proceeded to treat the
transactions as commercial speech because "they at most embody 'expression related solely
to the economic interest of the speaker and its audience."' Id (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas &
Electric. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)).
92. Id. at 55.
93. Id. at 55-57.
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Hampshire did meet its evidentiary burden for each of the inferences in the
causal chain, specifically that: (1) "detailing increases the prescription of
brand-name drugs, . .[which] tend to be more expensive"; (2) access to
physicians' prescribing histories heightens the pernicious effect of
detailing; and (3) notwithstanding the increased cost, "many aggressively
detailed drugs provide no [enhanced] benefit" to patients as compared to
their generic counterparts and may even cause medical harm.94
Turning to the third CentralHudson prong (i.e., whether the regulation is
"in reasonable proportion to the interest served"), 95 the court concluded that
the Prescription Information Law offered a precisely defined response to a
pervasive problem that had been resistant to previous regulatory efforts. 96
New Hampshire was entitled to reject the three alternatives embraced by the
district court, since none of them represented effective options. For
example, a blanket ban on gifts between detailers and physicians would
have carried the unintended consequence of cutting off the flow of free
samples that doctors often dispense to indigent patients otherwise unable to
afford their medications.98 The proposed counter-detailing program
"fail[ed] as a matter of simple economics" given the exorbitant amount of
state resources that would have been required to compete on a level playing
field with the promotional activities of the pharmaceutical companies. 99
Having decided that New Hampshire's statute comported fully with the
First Amendment's free speech requirements, the court summarily disposed
of the plaintiffs' void-for-vagueness argument. While acknowledging that
the Prescription Information Law was "not a model of legislative
craftsmanship," the court insisted the state had clearly and deliberately
crafted its statute so as to prohibit commercial uses related only to
detailing. 00 The state's Attorney General had confirmed that nothing would
bar a pharmaceutical company from using PI data for other purposes (e.g.,
research or recruitment of doctors to take part in clinical trials), so long as
the company refrained from marketing directly to New Hampshire-based
physicians participating in that research or trial.10 Moreover, the court
dismissed the idea of a chilling effect on the transfer of PI data for
permissible uses, noting that pharmacies, health plans, and other sources of
such data could protect themselves from liability simply by imposing
conditions in their sales or license agreements requiring purchasers to
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 57-58.
Id. at 59 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 61-62.
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comply with the New Hampshire statute.102
As for IMS Health and Verispan's dormant Commerce Clause challenge,
the court found the plaintiffs' contention that New Hampshire had sought to
regulate conduct occurring wholly outside the state equally unconvincing. o0
Although the Prescription Information Law did not contain an explicit
geographic limitation, the court relied on two principles of statutory
construction to resolve the issue: the doctrine of constitutional avoidancel 04
and the presumption that state laws have no extraterritorial effect.'os New
Hampshire's Attorney General had encouraged the First Circuit to interpret
the Prescription Information Law as governing only activity that took place
within the state's borders, and the court found it reasonable to follow that
narrowed reading - particularly since "the upshot of doing [otherwise]
would be to annul the statute." 06
B.

IMS Health Inc. v. Mills

Nearly two years later in IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, a majority of the First
Circuit upheld Maine's law barring so-called prescription drug information
intermediaries (PDIs) 0 7 from "licensing, using, selling, transferring, or
exchanging" PI data for marketing purposes.'os As noted, unlike New
Hampshire's statute, Maine's amendment to its Prescription Privacy Law
contained an opt-out mechanism' 09 allowing physicians to maintain the
confidentiality of their prescribing histories, and permitting pharmaceutical
companies to use such information for detailing unless a physician had

102. Id. at 62.
103. Id at 62-63 (quoting Alliance of Auto. Mfrs. v. Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30, 35 (1st
Cir. 2005)) (noting that a statute which attempts to regulate conduct transpiring entirely
outside the enacting state "outstrips the limits of the enacting state's constitutional authority
and, therefore, is per se invalid.")).
104. Id at 63 (citing Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 78 (1997);
United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 38 (1st Cir. 2007)).
105. Id. (citing K-S Pharms., Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 962 F.2d 728, 730 (7th
Cir. 1992)).
106. Id at 63-64.
107. The statute defines a "prescription drug information intermediary" as "a person or
entity that communicates, facilitates or participates in the exchange of prescription drug
information regarding an individual or a prescriber." The term "includes, but is not limited
to, a pharmacy benefits manager, a health plan, an administrator and an electronic
transmission intermediary and any person or entity employed by or contracted to provide
services to that entity." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711 -E(1)(I) (2008).
108. Mills, 616 F.3d at 12-13; see also § 1711-E(2-A).
109. The majority mischaracterized § 1711 -E(4) as an "opt-in" provision that allowed
prescribers to choose confidentiality protection, rather than an "opt-out" provision making it
possible for them to safeguard their identifiable information from marketing uses. Mills, 616
F.3d at 19. This is inconsistent with the terms used by the parties and the district court in
IMS Health Corp. v. Rowe, 532 F. Supp. 2d 153, 179-80 (D. Me. 2007).
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chosen to designate his or her information as protected.' Bound by its
holding in Ayotte, the First Circuit concluded that the challenged portion of
Maine's law (§ 1711 -E(2-A)) regulated conduct and that, to the extent §
1711-E(2-A) restricted commercial speech,"' the statute met the Central
Hudson test.'12 Moreover, the statute's distinct opt-out provision directly
advanced Maine's "substantial purpose of protecting . .. prescribers from
having their identifying data used in unwanted solicitations by detailers, and
thus Maine's interests in lowering health care costs."ll 3
Mills reached the First Circuit in a unique posture. In August 2007, IMS
Health and Verispan - now joined by Source Healthcare Analytics, Inc. sued Maine's Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."' The data miners
asserted that the state's prescription data mining law imposed an
unconstitutional burden on protected speech pursuant to the First
Amendment; that the restrictions were void for being vague and overbroad;
and that the law sought to regulate out-of-state transactions in violation of
the dormant Commerce Clause.' 's The U.S. District Court for the District of
Maine agreed that § 1711-E(2-A) did not materially advance the state's
purported interest in patient and prescriber confidentiality, nor was it
narrowly tailored toward that end, thus entitling the plaintiffs to a
preliminary injunction." 6 Shortly thereafter, however, the First Circuit
rejected the substantially similar First Amendment claims that the plaintiffs
had made in Ayotte." 7
In affirming the constitutionality of § 1711-E(2-A), the First Circuit
emphasized that the differences between the New Hampshire and Maine
statutes only weakened the data miner plaintiffs' challenge to the latter." 8
For instance, Maine had incorporated several findings in its legislation
indicating that curtailing the use of PI data would reduce the influence of
detailing, promote prescription decisions rooted in medical and scientific
knowledge, and ultimately drive down health care costs." 9 Separate and

110. Mills, 616F.3d at 12-13.
111. Id. at 13. The majority defined the "speech" subject to regulation as "data contained
in databases and reports that [IMS Health, Verispan, and Source Healthcare Analytics] have
designed to facilitate detailing" - a clear instance of commercial speech. Id. at 21. Although
Maine's law touched upon various layers of the market for P1 data, it - like New
Hampshire's law - did not affect in any way the communications between pharmaceutical
representatives and prescribers. Id. at 16.
112. Id. at 13, 21.
113. Id. at 19.
114. Rowe, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 166.
115. Id.
116.

Id. at 176, 183.

117.
118.
119.

IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 2010).
Id at 19.
Id
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apart from the First Circuit's rationale in Ayotte, the Maine statute's opt-out
mechanism directly served the state's substantial interest "in vindicating
Maine prescribers' rights to avoid unwanted targeting by detailers . .. on
the basis of their individual prescribing histories." 12 0
The court likened this opt-out provision to existing "do not call" or "do
not mail" registry laws, which were designed to address head-on the
problem of personal identifying information being sold, licensed,
transferred, exchanged, or used to bombard unwilling listeners with targeted
marketing messages.121 Indeed, the court found it significant that the
impetus for § 1711-E(2-A) came from Maine prescribers demanding that
the legislature prevent their identifiable data from falling into the hands of,
and being surreptitiously used by, detailers.12 2 Rather than enact a
categorical ban on the use of PI data for marketing purposes, the legislature
responded with a less restrictive measure that "provide[d] exactly the
protections that Maine prescribers ha[d] requested and allow[ed] prescribers
to choose whether to invoke them."l 23 As in Ayotte, Maine acted well
within its authority in deciding that alternatives such as restrictions on free
drug samples, physician education, or formulary controls would have done
little to contain health care costs and nothing to prevent the unapproved use
of prescribers' identifying data for detailing. 124
With respect to the plaintiffs' void-for-vagueness argument, the court
found that § 1711-E(2-A)'s terms - specifically, "for any marketing
purpose" - were not "'so uncertain that persons of average intelligence
would have no choice but to guess at [their] meaning and modes of
application."' 1 25 Moreover, the plaintiffs could not paint themselves as
"unwitting middlemen" selling PI data to pharmaceutical companies
without knowledge of its ultimate application when the record made
pellucid that the data mining companies intended their reports to be used in

detailing.126
Notwithstanding the reality that the plaintiffs had obtained an injunction
before § 1711 -E(2-A) went into effect, the court approached the dormant
Commerce Clause claim in Mills as an as-applied, rather than a facial,
120. Id. at 20.
121. Id. at 21-22 (citing Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-38 (1970)
and FTC v. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 345 F.3d 850, 854-55 (10th Cir. 2003)).
122. Id. at 15, 22 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711-E(1-A)(B)).
123. Id at 22. Because in-state physicians themselves retained control over whether or
not their information could be used for otherwise prohibited purposes, the court rejected the
plaintiffs' assertions that Maine's law constituted a paternalistic attempt to shield prescribers
from messages that the government found objectionable. Id.
124. Id. at 22-23.
125. Id at 23 (quoting United States v. Nieves-Castafio, 480 F.3d 597, 603 (1st Cir.
2007) (internal citation omitted)).
126. Id.
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challenge.1 27 Unlike in Ayotte, Maine's Attorney General had not taken the
position that the state sought only to regulate conduct within its own
borders, 128 giving the court occasion to engage in a more robust dormant
Commerce Clause analysis. 129 Focusing on § 1711-E(2-A)'s text, its
legislative history, and Maine's canons of statutory construction, the court
resolved that the law did apply to plaintiffs' out-of-state transactions
involving opted-out prescribers' identifying information.130 However, the
court felt that Maine's efforts to regulate PDIs' out-of-state use or sale of
opted-out Maine prescribers' data posed no problem under the dormant
Commerce Clause.' 3 ' As the court noted, the dormant Commerce Clause
fundamentally seeks to combat economic protectionist policies that
discriminate against out-of-state entities in favor of in-state competitors or
impose burdensome regulatory obligations inconsistent with those found in
other states. 32 Maine's statute implicated none of these concerns; instead,
the Maine legislature had acted within the scope of its police power by
restricting transactions that ultimately affected the health, safety, and
welfare of Maine citizens. 33
Finally, the majority stated that § 1711 -E(2-A) easily satisfied the socalled Pike balancing test for gauging whether a regulation
disproportionately burdens interstate commerce relative to the in-state
benefits achieved.134 The plaintiffs had failed to show that losing data about
the 259 Maine prescribers who had opted out as of September 2009 13
would impact the marketability of their aggregated reports.'36 Furthermore,
127. Id. at 24 n.19. Given the nature of the challenge, the First Circuit left open the
question of whether § 171 1-E(2-A) applied to pharmacies' or pharmaceutical manufacturers'
out-of-state license, use, sale, transfer, or exchange for value of opted-out Maine prescribers'
data. Id. at 24 n.20.
128. Id. at 39-40 (Lipez, J., concurring) (highlighting that, "Maine distances itself from
the nonsensical construction of the New Hampshire statute that was advanced by the New
Hampshire Attorney General and accepted by the Ayotte majority, admitting that its statute
inevitably reaches out of state to regulate sales of data about prescriptions written in
Maine.").
129. See id.at 23-32.
130. Id. at 25-26.
131. Id. at 27.
132. Id. at 27-28.
133. Id. at 28. Despite the law's incidental effects on interstate commerce, the court
insisted that the extraterritoriality doctrine was inapplicable to § 1711 -E(2-A). Id. at 31. The
statute only sought to protect Maine prescribers' identifiable information from being used to
target physicians in Maine for pharmaceutical marketing, and to address the exclusively instate harms flowing from those interactions. Id at 29.
134. Id. at 32 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
135. Id. As the court emphasized, the data mining companies still had access to
information about approximately 7,250 Maine prescribers who had declined to opt out, not
to mention 1.5 million prescribers nationwide. Id.
136. Id. at 32 & n.34 (pointing out that "[p]laintiffs have provided no data about [the]
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the plaintiffs had not established that complying with the mandate against
sale or use of these prescribers' information would be especially difficult or
costly from an interstate commerce perspective.1 37 On the other hand, §
1711 -E(2-A) would confer clear benefits in Maine by allowing prescribers
to avoid targeted detailing visits by opting out. 13 8
C.

IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell

Notwithstanding the rationale of its sister circuit, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that laws banning the sale,
transmission, or use of PI data for pharmaceutical marketing purposes
violate the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. 139 In IMS Health Inc. v.
Sorrell,a majority of the Second Circuit overturned Vermont's Prescription
Confidentiality Law, 140 viewing it as a regulation of commercial speech that
did not survive intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson. 14 1 So-called
Act 80, § 17 did not, in the Second Circuit's eyes, directly advance
Vermont's asseverated interests in safeguarding medical privacy, reining in
health care costs, and promoting public health, nor was the statute narrowly
tailored toward those ends. 142
As described above, § 17 contained three features that distinguished the
law from those enacted in Maine and New Hampshire. First, in addition to
prohibiting pharmacies, health insurers, self-insured employers, electronic
transmission intermediaries, and other similar entities from selling,
licensing, or exchanging for value records containing PI data, § 17 directly
forbade pharmaceutical manufacturers and marketers from using such
information to promote or market their products. 143 Second, § 17 included a
mechanism whereby providers could affirmatively consent to having their
prescribing histories used for marketing purposes, with confidentiality
protection serving as the default rule.144 Lastly, the Vermont legislature had
incorporated thirty-one specific findings to support the statute's passage,145
range of [PDIIs] subject to [§] 171 l-E(2-A) or the relative proportion of overall business
transacted in Maine versus outside it .... [T]he Pike balancing test is about burdens on the
interstate market as a whole, not about burdens on particular firms.").
137. Id at 32.
138. Id Before addressing the merits of the plaintiffs' Pike balancing test argument, the
court noted that the data miners had already waived the same by neglecting to raise that
theory in the proceedings below. Id. (citing Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found. v.
Biichel, 593 F.3d 38, 65 (1st Cir. 2010)).
139. IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 267 (2d Cir. 2010).
140. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631 (2009).
141. Sorrell, 630 F.3d at 267.
142. Id at 267.
143. Id. at 270 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 463 1(d)).
144. Id. at 269-70 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 463 1(c)(1)).
145. Id at 270 (citing Act of June 9, 2007, No. 80, § 1, 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves 635,
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several of which expressed the state's intent to amplify the volume of
information about generics within the marketplace of ideas by
disadvantaging information about brand-name drugs. 14 6
Sorrell moved through the courts as a consolidated case - one suit
originally brought against Vermont's Attorney General by IMS Health,
Verispan, and Source Healthcare Analytics, combined with another action
filed by PhRMA. 14 7 The U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont
refused to grant the plaintiffs' request for declaratory and injunctive relief,
holding that § 17 effectuated a restriction on commercial speech that passed
muster under the CentralHudson test and comported fully with the dormant
Commerce Clause. 148 On appeal, however, the Second Circuit reversed the
judgment on First Amendment grounds alone. 149
As the court saw it, § 17 could not be construed as simply the restriction
of a commercial practice.150 The PI data at issue represented speech, since
the First Amendment protects "'[e]ven dry information, devoid of
advocacy, political relevance, or artistic expression,"'15 1 as well as
information that exists in a form distributed for profit.152 For purposes of
trying to justify the rational basis review that would attend a regulation of
conduct, no practical distinction could be made between the "'use [of] a

635-39). Arguably, the legislative findings were crafted as part of a much broader statutory
scheme to address the problem of high prescription drug costs, and the parties in Sorrell
disagreed as to whether the findings actually corresponded to Act 80, § 17. For example, Act
80 also authorized funds for a counter-detailing initiative (i.e., an "evidence-based
prescription drug education program" to give physicians and other prescribers "information
and education on the therapeutic and cost-effective utilization of prescription drugs"). VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4622(a)(1) (2010). Act 80 also included a later-repealed provision that
forced detailers to provide information about alternative treatment options during their visits
with prescribers. Act of March 5, 2008, No. 89, § 3(f), 2008 Vt. Acts & Resolves 4, 6
(codified as amended at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631 (2009)).
146. Act of June 9, 2007, No. 80, § 1, 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves 635, 635-39. The
Second Circuit majority seemed troubled by the legislature's assertion that the goals of
pharmaceutical marketing were "'often in conflict with the goals of the state."' Sorrell, 630
F.3d at 270 (quoting No. 80, § 1(3)). Moreover, the legislature had explicitly noted its
concern that "the 'marketplace for ideas on medicine safety and effectiveness is frequently
one-sided,' leading doctors to prescribe 'drugs based on incomplete and biased
information."' Id. (quoting No. 80, § 1(4)). Accordingly, the Vermont legislature had
concluded that .'[p]ublic health is ill served by the massive imbalance in information
presented to doctors and other prescribers."' Id (quoting No. 80, § 1(6)).
147. Sorrell, 630 F.3d at 270.
148. Id. at 270-71 (citing IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 434, 455, 456-59
(D. Vt. 2009)).
149. Id. at 271.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 271-72 (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d
Cir. 2001)).
152. Id. at 272 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976)).
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particular informational asset - prescribing histories - in a particular way'
that the First Circuit had described in Ayotte and protected speech.,53
Moreover, the court emphasized the need for judicial skepticism of
legislative attempts to influence the supply of truthful information, a central
First Amendment concern.154
While Vermont argued that the plaintiffs had no First Amendment right
to access non-public health information that pharmacies were mandated to
collect under state and federal law, the court instead saw it as a matter of
"prevent[ing] willing sellers and willing buyers from completing a sale of
information to be used for purposes that the state disapproves."' 55 In
support of its position, Vermont had relied upon Los Angeles Police
Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., a case in which the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld limits on access to certain police department
information because the policy constituted "'nothing more than 56a
governmental denial of access to information in its possession.,"'
However, the PI data at issue rested in the hands of private actors rather
than within the government's possession, further buttressing plaintiffs'
assertions that § 17 regulated protected speech.157
Dealing first with the effect Vermont's Prescription Confidentiality Law
had on pharmaceutical manufacturers, the court declined to apply strict
scrutiny to the constraints on use of PI data simply because the downstream
detailing message included fully protected speech.' 58 Although suggesting
that the data miners' aggregation and sale of physicians' prescribing
histories might come closer to fully protected speech, the court assumed
without deciding that the statute regulated data mining companies'
commercial speech because § 17 could not withstand even intermediate
scrutiny.15 9
In applying the Central Hudson factors, the court concluded that
Vermont did possess a substantial interest in containing health care costs
and protecting public health, but that its proffered interest in medical
privacy was too speculative to qualify.160 The record contained no studies
153. Id. (quoting IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 54 (1st Cir. 2008)).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 273.
156. Id. (quoting L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., 528 U.S. 32,
40 (1999)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 274 (noting that "the mere presence of non-commercial information in an
otherwise commercial presentation does not transform the communication into fully
protected speech.").
159. Id. at 274-75.
160. Id. at 276. The majority parsed out Vermont's asserted interest in medical privacy
as consisting of two parts: (1) an interest in preserving "the integrity of the prescribing
process itself' and (2) an interest in promoting "patients' trust in their doctors by preventing
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showing that the use of prescribing histories by pharmaceutical marketers
undermined patients' confidence in their physicians, nor that specific
detailing interactions had caused Vermont doctors to prescribe
inappropriate and potentially harmful medications.' 6 ' Furthermore, § 17 did
not functionally protect the privacy of individual physicians, since the
statute allowed PI data to be sold, transferred, and used for any purpose
other than marketing or promoting a prescription drug,16 2 "including
widespread publication to the general public." 6 3
As the Second Circuit saw it, § 17 did not advance the state's interests in
public health and cost containment in a direct and material way.1 64 Rather
than restricting the prescribing practices of doctors or the detailing practices
of the pharmaceutical companies, Vermont had taken a circuitous approach
that "restrict[ed] the information available to detailers so that their
marketing practices [would] be less effective and less likely to influence the
prescribing practices of physicians."' 65 This attempt to regulate conduct
(i.e., the interactions between physicians and detailers) by stifling the
speech of data miners and pharmaceutical manufacturers was, according to
the court, directly antithetical to First Amendment principles guarding
against "'regulations that seek to keep people
in the dark for what the
66
good."'l
own
their
be
to
perceives
government
With respect to the narrow tailoring prong of CentralHudson, the court
found that § 17 also failed insofar as the statute barred the use of PI data
"for the marketing of any brand-name prescription, no matter how
efficacious and no matter how beneficial those drugs may be compared to
generic alternatives." 6 7 Since Vermont's goal was to stem the prescription
of new and expensive brand-name drugs with potentially undiscovered side
patients from believing that their physicians are inappropriately influenced by PI data-driven
marketing." Id
161. Id
162. Id at 275. Under § 17, Vermont contemplated that PI data might be used for any
of the following permissible purposes: "pharmacy reimbursement; prescription drug
formulary compliance; patient care management; utilization review by a health care
professional, the patient's health insurer, or the agent of either; health care research;
dispensing prescription medications; prescriber-to-pharmacy transmission of prescription
information; "care management; educational communications provided to a patient,
including treatment options, recall or safety notices, or clinical trials; and for certain law
enforcement purposes or as otherwise authorized by law." Id. at 270 (citing VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 463 1(e)(1)-(7) (2009)).
163. Id. at 275.
164. Id. at 277.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 277-78 (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503
(1996)); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980) ("We review with special care regulations that entirely suppress
commercial speech in order to pursue a non[-]speech-related policy.").
167. Id. at 279-80.
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effects or those brand-name medications that had generic alternatives, § 17
casted far too wide a net by prohibiting the use of PI data to market any
brand-name drug. 68 The fact that Vermont prescribers could affirmatively
choose to allow their data to be used for marketing purposes did not save §
17 from being considered a categorical ban in light of the statute's
application to all brand-name drugs, no matter how unique and
efficacious.169 The court also reasoned that Vermont had more direct, less
speech-restrictive methods available to advance its goals of cost
containment and protecting public health, including waiting to gauge the
impact of its own counter-detailing program.170
D.

Analysis of Circuit Court Opinions in Mills and Sorrell

The opposing judgments reveal fundamental differences in the First and
Second Circuits' First Amendment analyses.'7 An initial question under
First Amendment analysis is whether the statutes restrict speech, as opposed
to conduct.172 The First Circuit concluded its analysis with this first step,
ruling that neither the New Hampshire nor the Maine statute restricted
speech. 73 Rather, the First Circuit found that the New Hampshire and
Maine statutes regulated commercial conduct.174 The First Circuit construed
the challenged provisions of the New Hampshire statute as "principally
regulat[ing] conduct because those provisions serve only to restrict the
ability of data miners to aggregate, compile, and transfer information
destined for narrowly defined commercial ends." 7 5 Essentially, both the
New Hampshire and Maine statutes sought to solve a problem "not by
eliminating speech but, rather, by eliminating the detailers' ability to use a
particular informational asset . . in a particular way."' 76 For this reason, the
First Circuit held that the regulations fell outside the scope of the First
Amendment, precluding a challenge under the Free Speech Clause.177
The Second Circuit found its sister circuit's reasoning unpersuasive,
criticizing its assumption of "freewheeling authority to declare new
categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment." 7 8 The
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
F.3d 42,
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 280.
Id. at 272-73; IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2010).
Sorrell, 630 F.3d at 271; Mills, 616 F.3d at 18-19; IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550
50 (1st Cir. 2008).
Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 54; Mills, 616 F.3d at 19-20.
Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 53.
Id at 52.
Id. at 54.
Id
IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States
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Second Circuit focused heavily on the findings of the Vermont legislature
that bemoaned the one-sided nature of the information available to
prescribers due to the high investment in PI data to inform detailing.179 The
Vermont statute, in the Second Circuit's view, was explicitly aimed at
"influencing the supply of information, a core First Amendment
concern." 80 Likewise, the Second Circuit dismissed the state's argument
that this was "'nothing more than a governmental denial of access to
information in its possession,"' finding that the statute restricted protected
speech. 181

The finding that the regulation was within the scope of the First
Amendment required the Second Circuit to analyze whether the Vermont
statute violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights under the applicable
precedent. Although the First Circuit held that the regulation was outside
the purview of the First Amendment, it provided an alternate ground for its
decision if the New Hampshire and Maine laws were to be treated as
restrictions on protected speech.18 2 The applicable test that courts must
employ depends on whether the speech is determined to be commercial in
nature.' 83 Although the plaintiffs in each case argued that the statutes
restricted noncommercial speech, all three courts agreed that the primary
purpose of detailing is "to propose a commercial transaction," and thus the
speech at issue was commercial speech.184
In order to be held constitutional, government restrictions on commercial
speech must meet the test for intermediate scrutiny as outlined in Central
Hudson.'8 5 The first prong was easily met in both the First and Second
Circuit cases. The First Circuit reasoned that "fiscal problems have caused
entire civilizations to crumble" and so, cost containment by itself satisfies
the first prong of the Central Hudson inquiry.1 86 The Second Circuit
appellants did not dispute that protecting public health and containing
health care costs were substantial government interests.'87 However, the

v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct 1577, 1586 (2010)) (internal quotations omitted).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 273 (quoting L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., 528
U.S. 32, 40 (1999)).
182. Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 54.
183. Id at 54-55; Sorrell, 630 F.3d at 273-74.
184. Sorrell, 630 F.3d at 274. See Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 54-55; Mills, 616 F.3d at 20-21.
185. Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 55; Sorrell, 630 F.3d at 275.
186. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 55 (1st Cir. 2008). Although the First
Circuit in Ayotte did not go on to examine either public health or prescriber privacy as
substantial interests, the First Circuit did determine, in Mills, that the Maine statute "directly
serves Maine's substantial interest in vindicating Maine prescribers' rights to avoid
unwanted targeting by detailers." IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 20 (1st Cir. 2010).
187. IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 2010).
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Second Circuit held that "the state's asserted interest in medical privacy is
too speculative" to satisfy the first prong of CentralHudson.'88 The Second
Circuit reasoned that, because the statute continued to allow wide
dissemination of prescriber data, the statute could not serve the purpose of
protecting prescriber privacy in its traditional sense.189 Although the Second
Circuit clarified that it viewed medical privacy in this context as two
distinct interests - an interest in "the integrity of the prescribing process
itself and an interest in preserving patients' trust in their doctors" - it held
that Vermont did not have enough evidence to substantiate these privacy
interests.190
The second prong of Central Hudson is where the First and Second
Circuits divided sharply in their analysis. The First Circuit found that
"deference [was] in order,"'91 given that the New Hampshire statute was the
first of its kind enacted in the nation. Thus, the court did not demand
"certitude" that the statute would advance the asserted interest.192 Rather,
the First Circuit relied on common sense and held that the state adequately
demonstrated that implementation of the law would directly advance cost
containment efforts. 93 The First Circuit's analysis with respect to Maine's
law concluded that the statute directly advanced prescriber privacy.' 94 The
court relied heavily on the fact that Maine prescribers had "identified
detailers' use of personal prescribing histories as a singularly objectionable
practice. . . .[and] demanded legislative action to protect their identifying
data from this unwanted use."' 9 5 Therefore, the First Circuit held that the
New Hampshire and Maine statutes would directly advance cost
containment and prescriber privacy, respectively.196
In contrast, the Second Circuit held that the Vermont statute would not
advance public health and cost containment in any direct and material
way.197 The court held that the chain of events from the restriction on
pharmacies' sale of PI data to the eventual change in prescriber behavior
was too attenuated.198 The goals of cost containment and public health were
not met, the court reasoned, until at least three separate steps were taken

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 276.
Id. at 275-76.
Id.
Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 59.
Id. at 55.
Id.
IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 22 (1st Cir. 2010).
Id.
Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 59; Mills, 616 F.3d at 22.
IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 277 (2d Cir. 2010).
Id.
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after the regulation went into force.'99 At this point, the Second Circuit
elaborated upon what it saw as the real problem with the Vermont statute:
its true purpose was to suppress free expression. 20 0 The court characterized
the state's action as putting "the state's thumb on the scales of the
marketplace of ideas in order to influence conduct." 2 0 ' This arrangement
failed the second prong of the Central Hudson inquiry. Moreover, the
Second Circuit held that it was "antithetical to a long line of Supreme Court
cases" and paternalistic in nature.202
Regarding the third prong of the Central Hudson analysis, the Second
Circuit reasoned that Vermont's statute was not narrowly tailored, as it
would apply to all brand-name prescription drugs - whether or not there
was a generic equivalent and regardless of the clinical effectiveness of the
particular drug. 203 Furthermore, the court held that there were more direct
and less restrictive means available to achieve the desired ends.204 The court
suggested a government-sponsored counter-speech program, such as
academic detailing, and the distribution of generic samples as methods of
containing costs and protecting public health that would be less restrictive
of free speech. 20 5 The court also highlighted some traditional costcontainment policies, such as a generic substitution mandate, as alternatives
that would be more narrowly tailored to advancing the state's interests. 206 In
contrast, the First Circuit dismissed these other means of achieving cost
containment as inadequate in the face of current pharmaceutical marketing
practices.20 7 The First Circuit determined that New Hampshire's statute was
sufficiently narrowly tailored in that it provided the least extensive means
of reducing overall health care costs and therefore met the third prong of the
CentralHudson inquiry. 20 8 With respect to Maine's statute, the First Circuit
emphasized that the law's distinctive opt-out mechanism offered a targeted
approach to vindicate the state's goals.209
Interestingly, the First Circuit consistently showed greater deference to
the states' legislatures than did the Second Circuit. The First Circuit
examined the legislative record with considerably less rigor. In contrast, the
Second Circuit weighed the free speech interests of the data mining

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 277-78.
IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 280.
Id.
Id.
IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 59-60 (1st Cir. 2008).
Id. at 60.
IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 21-23 (1st Cir. 2010).
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companies and the pharmaceutical manufacturers more heavily than the
legislative agenda of Vermont, probing more deeply into the legislative
reasoning behind Vermont's choice of means to realize its asseverated
interests.
IV. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S GRANT OF CERTIORARI AND ORAL
ARGUMENTS
In January 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
Second Circuit's decision striking down Vermont's Prescription
Confidentiality Law. 2 10 The Supreme Court had denied a petition for
certiorari in 2009 to review the First Circuit's decision in Ayotte. 211
However, the Second Circuit's subsequent decision in Sorrell highlighted a
clear circuit split that contributed to making the issue ripe for review.
The variant legal reasoning employed by the five courts (three district
courts and two circuit courts) that considered the New Hampshire, Maine,
and Vermont laws reflect doctrinal uncertainty with respect to commercial
speech. In fact, statutes seeking to curtail prescription data mining have the
somewhat unusual position of falling within a doctrinal analysis that is the
subject of an ongoing debate among commentators and within the Supreme
Court itself.2 12 The Central Hudson inquiry has been unevenly applied,
creating uncertainty about the limits on when and how a state may impose
restrictions on commercial free speech.2 13 At the same time, while only
three states have passed laws curtailing access to PI data, twenty-six other
states (including the District of Columbia) have proposed such statutes in
the past three years.214 Indeed, states are searching for innovative ways to
contain the ballooning costs of health care, particularly prescription drug
costs, and limiting access to PI data represents one of the potential solutions
in this arena.21 s However, these efforts face an uncertain fate with the
possibility of being thwarted by lengthy and costly litigation. 216 The
Supreme Court, by its grant of certiorari, seized the opportunity to both
clarify the surrounding legal doctrine and guide pursuits in legislative
policy.
The question presented before the Court was "[w]hether a law that
restricts access to information in nonpublic prescription drug records and

210. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 857 (2011).
211. IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte, 129 S. Ct. 2864 (2009).
212. Mills, 616 F.3d at 47 (Lipez, J., concurring); Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 96-97.
213. Mills, 616 F.3d at 47; Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 96-97.
214. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 26-27. See Amicus Brief for the
States, supra note 40, at 8.
215. Amicus Brief for the States, supra note 40, at 26-27.
216. Amicus Brief for the States, supra note 40, at 9.
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affords prescribers the right to consent before their identifying information
in prescription drug records is sold or used in marketing runs afoul of the
First Amendment." 2 17 The parties' briefs in response to this question
mirrored the legal arguments made before the U.S. District Court for the
District of Vermont and Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In addition, the
parties on each side took this opportunity to refine their characterizations of
the statute.
Vermont continued to depict the statute as a restriction on access to
nonpublic information that bolstered physicians' control over the
distribution of their personal information.21 By focusing on pharmacies'
dissemination of data and the allocation of greater power to prescribers, the
state attempted to distance itself from any effect on the pharmaceutical
representatives' marketing messages or communications.219 In contrast, the
data mining companies and PhRMA focused precisely on the statute's
effect on the messages that pharmaceutical representatives are able to
communicate to prescribers. 2 20 The respondents sought to draw attention to
what they argued was the statute's true intention: the restraint of truthful,
even socially valuable, commercial messages that the state disfavored.22'
The contours of the free speech doctrine would ultimately be determined
based on which aspect of the transaction would persuade the Court and
which party's characterization of the statute would be adopted.
At oral arguments, the Justices seemed to focus heavily on the statute's
detailing
effective restriction of pharmaceutical representatives'
communications. The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia, in particular, had
little patience for the state's characterization of the statute as one that
sought to "let doctors decide whether sales representatives will have access
to this inside information about what they have been prescribing to their
patients."222 The Chief Justice saw the statute's purpose as "prevent[ing]
sales representatives from contacting particular physicians." 2 23 Likewise,
Justice Scalia reiterated many times that the purpose of the statute is to
"stop [pharmaceutical representatives] from using [PI data] in order to
market their drugs."224 In fact, much of the oral arguments focused on
"discrimination" against a particular type of speech and a particular type of
speaker - detailing and pharmaceutical representatives, respectively. 225
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at i.
Amicus Brief for the States, supra note 40, at 1, 4, 6.
See Amicus Brief for the States, supra note 40, at 2.
Brief of Respondents, supra note 74, at 16-20.
Brief of Respondents, supra note 74, at 49-56.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 46, at 4.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 54-57, 64-65.
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Even the liberal-leaning justices seemed to be persuaded by IMS Health's
characterization of the statute as one that aimed to limit disfavored
speech. 226 Justice Ginsberg, remarking on the cost-containment strategy of
the law, said pointedly, "[Y]ou can't lower the decibel level of one speaker
,, 227
so that another speaker, in this case the generics, can be heard better. . .".
Further, IMS Health's position was strengthened by its strategy at oral
argument of emphasizing that the case needed "to be decided somewhere in
the middle" between protecting prescriber privacy and distorting the
marketplace of ideas. 228 Justice Sotomayor seemed particularly receptive to
this compromise strategy. She asked counsel several times about the
viability of an opt-out structure rather than the opt-in structure that the
Vermont legislature chose to adopt, alluding to the fact that an opt-out
would be less problematic under free speech doctrine.22 9
The middle-of-the-road approach that respondents suggested presented
the Court with an opportunity to draw lines between the New Hampshire
statute (which affects all prescribers) and the Maine statute (which affects
only those prescribers who affirmatively indicate that they would like their
PI data to be protected from use in marketing and promotion). This
conservative and pragmatic approach to oral arguments benefited the
respondents. In contrast, Vermont's steadfast avoidance of what the Justices
believed to be the true purpose of the statute did not appear to serve the
state well in making a convincing legal argument before the Court. Based
upon the Justices' reaction to each party's oral arguments, media
commentators predicted that the Court would find that Vermont's law
violated the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause.230
V. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: SORRELL V. IMSHEALTHINC.
A.

The Majority Opinion

On June 23, 2011, the Court, by a ruling of 6-3, struck down the
Prescription Confidentiality Law on grounds that the regulation imposed
content- and speaker-based burdens on protected speech, thus warranting

226. Id. at 14.
227. Id
228. Id at 32-33.
229. Id. at 13, 46.
230. See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Skeptical that PrescriptionData Laws Don't
Violate Free Speech, WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/supreme-court-skeptical-that-prescription-data-laws-dont-violate-freespeech/2011/04/26/AFDKIzsE story.html; Adam Liptak, Justices' Debate Turns to Privacy
for Doctors, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/business/27
bizcourt.html.
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"heightened" - not intermediate - scrutiny. 231 While recognizing the
importance of Vermont's asserted interests in protecting medical privacy,
reducing health care costs, and safeguarding public health, Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, concluded that the statute did not meet this
rigorous First Amendment standard.232
For purposes of analysis, Justice Kennedy divided the operative
provision of the statute (§ 4631(d)) 233 into three constituent parts: (1) the
prohibition against pharmacies, health insurers, and other similar entities
selling PI data without the physician's consent; 234 (2) the ban on
pharmacies, health insurers, and other similar entities permitting the use of
opted-in physicians' identifiable information for marketing activities; and
(3) the restriction directly forbidding pharmaceutical manufacturers and
marketers from using PI data without consent to shape their marketing
messages.235 According to the majority, the first two measures
discriminated against speech on the basis of content, given that § 4631(e)
contemplated several state-approved purposes for which PI data could be
sold and used.236 Beyond disfavoring marketing, the statute by its terms
burdened pharmaceutical companies and detailers, while leaving the door
open for the information to be "purchased or acquired by other speakers
with diverse . .. viewpoints" (i.e., academic organizations or other entities
who might use the information for counter-detailing).2 37
As for the injudiciously worded legislative findings that accompanied
Act 80, the majority found that the legislature's statement that detailers'
messages often conflicted with the goals of the state evinced Vermont's
clear intent to "diminish the effectiveness of marketing by manufacturers of
231. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011).
2 3 2. Id.
233. The Supreme Court used "§ 4631" as shorthand for the Prescription Confidentiality
Law. This reflects the law's official citation in the Vermont Statutes, rather than the session
law citation employed by the Second Circuit.
234. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660. The Court chastised Vermont for offering an
interpretation of this provision at oral argument that diverged from the construction the state
initially provided. Id. at 2662. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 46, at 18-21.
Initially, Vermont represented that the first portion of § 4631(d) barred pharmacies, health
insurers, and other similar entities from selling or distributing PI data for marketing purposes
only. At oral argument, Vermont represented that the sentence at issue prohibited regulated
entities from selling PI data for any purpose, aside from the exceptions specified in §
4631(e). Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2662. In a comment that did not bode well for Vermont's case,
the Court noted it was especially disconcerting for the state to waver on the interpretation of
its own statute "in a First Amendment case, where plaintiffs have a special interest in
obtaining a prompt adjudication of their rights, despite potential ambiguities of state law."
Id. (citing Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 467-68, n.17 (1987); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S.
241, 252 (1967)).
235. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660.
236. Id. at 2663.
237. Id.
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brand-name drugs." 2 3 8 The majority viewed this as a specific, content-based
burden on otherwise protected speech that triggered heightened scrutiny. 23 9
Moreover, Vermont's argument that heightened scrutiny was inapplicable
to mere commercial regulations had no merit in the majority's view, since §
4631 exacted "more than an incidental burden on protected expression."240
The ban on the sale or use of PI data imposed by § 4631 differed in material
ways from, for example, a ban on race-based hiring that would in turn
require employers to remove "White Applicants Only" signS2 4 1 or a
municipal ordinance prohibiting outdoor fires that might happen to forbid
flag-buming. 242 In enacting § 4631, Vermont had explicitly regulated
commercial speech based upon its content and the speakers' dissemination
of it. 243
With respect to Vermont's contention that the Prescription
Confidentiality Law restricted access to information that the data-mining
and pharmaceutical companies had no right to obtain, the majority found it
unpersuasive that PI data was "generated in compliance with a legal
mandate.. . and so could be considered a kind of governmental
information." 244 As the Second Circuit had done, the majority distinguished
United Reporting by pointing out that § 4631 dealt with access to records
already in private hands and therefore implicated the regulated entities'
right to use or disseminate information within their possession.245 Also, the
complainant in United Reporting had not suffered a personal First
Amendment injury insofar as the plaintiff had neither "attempt[ed] to
qualify" for access to the police records in question nor presented an asapplied challenge.246 By contrast, the majority believed that IMS Health,

238. Id
239. Id. at 2664 (citing Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 418 (1993)
(applying a higher level of scrutiny to "a categorical prohibition on the use of newsracks to
disseminate commercial messages"); Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
658 (1994) (emphasizing that regulations manifesting "aversion" to what "disfavored
speakers" have to say should be subject to strict scrutiny)). See also Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (noting that the First Amendment mandates strict scrutiny
anytime the government promulgates "a regulation of speech because of disagreement with
the message it conveys").
240. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2665.
241. Id. (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S.
47, 62 (2006)).
242. Id. (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992)).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984); Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); N.Y. Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam)).
246. Id. at 2666 (quoting L.A. Police Dept. v. United Reporting, 528 U.S. 32, 40
(1999)).
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Verispan, Source Healthcare Analytics, and PhRMA had a solid basis for
asserting that § 4631 impermissibly burdened their own speech.247
Furthermore, the majority refused to construe § 4631 as a regulation of
conduct, reasoning that the creation and distribution of information
constituted protected expression within the meaning of the First
Amendment.24 8 The majority noted that "[flacts, after all, are the beginning
point for much of the speech that is most essential to advance human
knowledge and to conduct human affairs." 24 9 Even assuming that PI data
represented a "mere commodity," as Vermont argued, the majority found §
250
4631 (d)'s restrictions abhorrent to the First Amendment.
After finding the Prescription Confidentiality Law to be content-based on
its face and viewpoint-discriminatory in practice, the majority concluded
that § 4631 could not withstand even intermediate scrutiny and therefore
proceeded to apply commercial-speech analysis. 25 ' First, the majority
rejected the notion that § 4631 was drawn to serve Vermont's asserted
interest in protecting medical privacy.2 52 Although the state's physicians
had an interest in preserving the confidentiality of their prescription
decisions, § 4631 did not further that interest insofar as pharmacies retained
the ability to transfer PI data to anyone for any purpose aside from
marketing, and insurers, researchers, journalists, the state, and others could
use that information to engage in activities expressly permitted under §
4631(e).253 The majority did intimate that Vermont could have developed

247. Id.
248. Id. at 2667 (citing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 ("[I]f the acts of
'disclosing' and 'publishing' information do not constitute speech, it is hard to imagine what
does fall within that category, as distinct from the category of expressive conduct" (some
internal quotation marks omitted)); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481 (1995)
("information on beer labels" is speech); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985) (plurality opinion) (credit report is "speech")).
249. Id.
250. Id. Notwithstanding the lower level of scrutiny traditionally applied to commercial
speech, the majority displayed a markedly protectionist attitude toward such expression in
this case. For example, the majority explicitly stated that, "[a] 'consumer's concern for the
free flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political
dialogue.' That reality has great relevance in the fields of medicine and public health, where
information can save lives." Id. at 2664 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350,
364 (1977)).
251. Id. at 2667. Since the nature of the speech bore no relevance to the outcome of the
analysis, the majority also found it unnecessary to tease out whether all speech hindered by §
4631 was commercial, or whether this was an instance where "'pure speech and commercial
speech' were inextricably intertwined, so that 'the entirety must . . . be classified as
noncommercial."' Id. (quoting Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474
(1989)).
252. Id. at 2668.
253. Id.
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"'a more coherent policy"' 25 4 to address physician confidentiality "by
allowing the [regulated] information's sale or disclosure in only a few
narrow and well-justified circumstances."25 5 However, by making
purportedly private records "available to an almost limitless audience" with the exception of "a narrow class of disfavored speakers" - Vermont
had undermined its own medical privacy argument.25 6
As for § 463 1's opt-in provision, the majority believed this insufficient to
"insulate [the Prescription Confidentiality Law] from First Amendment
challenge." 257 The opt-in mechanism, though providing physicians a
modicum of privacy, in fact presented them with a perverse choice either to
consent to their information being sold and used for marketing or to
withhold consent, thereby participating in the state's objective of
"burdening disfavored speech by disfavored speakers." 258 Given that § 4631
left numerous uses of PI data untouched, the majority concluded that
replacing the statute's opt-in language with a less-restrictive opt-out
provision would not help to dispel the problematic reality that Vermont had
sought to suppress a particular distasteful message.2 59
The majority seemed equally unreceptive to Vermont's insistence that §
4631 was necessary to shield physicians from detailers' "'harassing sales
behaviors."' 260 Only "a few" physicians had apparently sought legislative
relief - an insufficient basis for upholding such a sweeping content- and
speaker-based speech restriction. 26 1 "Many are those who must endure
speech they do not like, but that is a necessary cost of freedom," offered the
majority. 262 To the extent physicians found visits from pharmaceutical
representatives bothersome or intrusive, they could easily refuse to meet
with the detailers.263 The state's argument that detailers' manipulative use
of PI data threatened the integrity of the physician-patient relationship not
only lacked merit, but also ran counter to First Amendment values.2 6 As
254. Id. (citing Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173,
195 (1999); Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428 (1993)).
255. Id (citing Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §
1320d-2; 45 CFR pts. 160 & 164 (2010)).
256. Id
257. Id. at 2669.
258. Id

259.

Id.

260. Id. (quoting 2007 Vt. Laws No. 80, § 1(28)). The legislature had also found that
.'[s]ome doctors in Vermont are experiencing an undesired increase in the aggressiveness of
pharmaceutical sales representatives, . . . and a few have reported that they felt coerced and
harassed."' 2007 Vt. Laws No. 80, § 1(20).
261. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2669.
262. Id. (citing Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
263. Id.
264. Id at 2670.
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the majority opined, "If pharmaceutical marketing affects treatment
decisions, it does so because doctors find it persuasive.

. ..

[T]he fear that

speech might persuade provides no lawful basis for quieting it." 26 5
Relying largely on its rationale with respect to Vermont's medical
privacy argument, the majority decided that § 4631(d) also represented an
impermissible means for the state to advance the public policy goals of
reining in health care costs and protecting public health.266 Vermont's
approach was both indirect 267 and premised on the paternalistic view that
physicians would make inappropriate prescribing decisions if exposed to
targeted detailing. 268 The majority concluded that such an assumption was
particularly noxious, where the audience (i.e., physicians and other
prescribers) consisted of "'sophisticated and experienced' consumers."269
Moreover, the record demonstrated that physicians had conflicting
perspectives about the benefits of detailing; some Vermont doctors actually
endorsed the use of PI data in marketing, since it allowed detailers to tailor
their presentations based on the practitioner.270 The United States, which
appeared before the Court in support of § 4631, had also challenged
Vermont's "'unwarranted 27view that the dangers of [n]ew drugs outweigh
their benefits to patients."' 1
As the majority viewed it, this divergence of opinion about detailing and
brand-name-drug prescriptions would be best resolved through more
speech, not less. 2 72 Toward that end, Vermont remained free to pursue its
own counter-detailing initiative, but the state could not "hamstring the
opposition" by burdening data miners' or pharmaceutical companies'
,,273
Since
speech "in order to tilt public debate in a preferred direction.
Vermont in no way claimed that § 4631 sought to regulate detailing as a
form of false or misleading speech, the majority insisted that the state's
purported justification for restricting the commercial expression at issue
265. Id. (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam)).
266. Id
267. Id As the majority pointed out, Vermont itself seemed reticent to acknowledge the
logistical link between prohibiting the sale and use of PI data for marketing and achieving
the state's latter two public policy goals. Id. At oral argument, Vermont repeatedly denied
that the goal of § 4631 was to make detailing less effective and prevent such messages from
influencing physicians' prescribing decisions. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 46, at
5-6.
268. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2670-71 (citing Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S.
357, 374 (2002); Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 769-70 (1976)).
269. Id. at 2671 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 775 (1993)).
270. Id.
271. Id. (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 24
n.4, Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (No. 10-779)).
272. Id.
273. Id.
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"turn[ed] on nothing more than a difference of opinion." 27 4
It is important to note that, on balance, the majority appeared most
sympathetic to the challenges Vermont faced in protecting physicians'
private information from unauthorized and unwanted disclosure. 2 75
However, Vermont had adopted an approach ill-suited to that purpose
insofar as § 4631 accorded pharmacies, insurers, and other similar entities
"broad discretion and wide latitude" when it came to disclosing PI data,
while simultaneously handicapping pharmaceutical companies' ability to
276
use the same information for marketing purposes.26
According to the
majority, Vermont had misappropriated the privacy concept in attempts to
justify its treatment of disfavored speakers and a disfavored topic. 27 7
B.

The Dissenting Opinion

Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, issued the
dissenting opinion. Citing the seminal 1938 case of U.S. v. Carolene
Products Co., the dissent noted that "'regulatory legislation affecting
ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional"'
when it is predicated "'upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators."' 2 78 Justice Breyer suggested that the
heightened scrutiny imposed by the majority was inappropriate in this case
because it was applied to "legitimate commercial regulatory objectives." 2 79
According to Justice Breyer, the First Amendment properly imposes
restrictions on governmental efforts to limit "core" political speech, but
"looser constraints" are in order for commercial speech or speech by an
entity that falls under a "traditional regulatory program." 28 0 Justice Breyer
thought it crucial to maintain the Court's longstanding distinction between
the First Amendment interests in maintaining a free marketplace for "social,
political, esthetic, [and] moral ... ideas" versus for speech "'proposing a
commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to
government regulation.'.28 1
274. Id at 2672 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983);
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376 (2002)).
275. Id (stating that "The capacity of technology to find and publish personal
information, including records required by the government, presents serious and unresolved
issues with respect to personal privacy and the dignity it seeks to secure.").
276. Id.
277. Id (asserting that "Privacy is a concept too integral to the person and a right too
essential to freedom to allow its manipulation to support just those ideas the government
prefers.").
278. Id. at 2675 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 (1938)).
279. Id. at 2673.
280. Id. at 2674-75.
281. Id. at 2674 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)
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Justice Breyer thus would have reviewed § 4631(d) using intermediate
scrutiny - a First Amendment standard appropriate for matters involving
economic regulation, but at odds with the heightened scrutiny required by
the majority.282 Justice Breyer pointed out that the pharmaceutical industry
is already heavily regulated, including substantial regulation of the very
promotional activities affected here.283 Indeed, Justice Breyer argued, the PI
data restricted by the Vermont statute only existed because of government
regulation. 284 "Regulators will often find it necessary to create tailored
restrictions on the use of information subject to their regulatory
jurisdiction," Justice Breyer noted. 285 For example, a public utilities
commission directing local gas distributors to collect usage information
from customers might permissibly allow the distributors to give researchers
the information in the interests of lowering energy costs, while prohibiting
sales of the data to appliance manufacturers seeking to identify potential gas
stove buyers.286 Justice Breyer challenged that the Supreme Court had
simply "never found that the First Amendment prohibits the government
from restricting the use of information gathered pursuant to a regulatory
mandate - whether the information rests in government files or has
remained in the hands of the private firms that gathered it." 2 87 Similarly,
Justice Breyer noted that the Supreme Court had never before imposed
heightened scrutiny in this type of regulatory matter.288
Justice Breyer also criticized the majority's use of the "content-based"
and "speaker-based" labels, arguing that such terms have no meaning in the
context of commercial speech. 2 89 Regulatory programs by nature draw
distinctions on the basis of content,290 and many legislative or
administrative rules affect a narrowly defined class of entities.291 Using
(quoting Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (emphasis added))).
282. Id. at 2675.
283. Id. at 2676.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id
287. Id. at 2677.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. For example, the Federal Reserve Board oversees the content of statements,
advertising, loan proposals, and interest rate disclosures made by financial institutions, while
the FDA exercises regulatory power over labeling, advertising, and sales proposals of drugs.
Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. pts. 226, 230; 21 C.F.R. pts. 201-203).
291. By way of illustration, Justice Breyer pointed to regulatory provisions mandating
that producers of home appliances, but not industrial equipment manufacturers, publish
strategies for conserving energy. Id. at 2678 (citing 16 C.F.R. pt. 305). Moreover, the FDA
controls what claims a pharmaceutical company can make to prospective buyers about
intended uses for its products (i.e., off-label promotion), although such restrictions do not
apply to researchers, providers, etc. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. pt. 99).

Published by LAW eCommons, 2012

37

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 21 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 7

484

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 21

"heightened" scrutiny as the benchmark by which to test every regulation of
commercial activities would potentially "undercut the [ ] constitutional
goal" of "facilitating the democratic creation of sound government policies
without improperly hampering the ability of government to introduce an
agenda, to implement its policies, and to favor them to the exclusion of
contrary policies." 29 2 In sum, Justice Breyer believed that the "unforgiving"
brand of scrutiny that the Court used to assess Vermont's statute seriously
threatened the legislative/judicial balance and, if religiously applied, would
constrain states' ability to respond in a reasonable manner to problems
involving commerce and industry.2 93
Turning to the constitutional merits of the case, Justice Breyer concluded
that § 4631 withstood either intermediate scrutiny as a regulation of
commercial speech or rational basis review as a mere economic
regulation.294 Justice Breyer viewed each of Vermont's asserted interests preservation of medical privacy, reduction of health care costs, and
protection of public health - as important purposes that were "neutral" with
respect to speech.29 5 With respect to the latter two goals, Vermont's
legislature could reasonably have found that § 4631 would directly promote
cost containment and public health by ensuring that detailers' messages
remained rooted in scientific research about a particular drug's safety and
effectiveness, as well as objective information about the medication's
costs. 2 96 Since the legislative record for § 4631 included statements from
several experts attesting to the secretive, manipulative, and harmful
advantage that detailers gained through use of PI data, Justice Breyer felt
that Vermont had acted appropriately in seeking to ensure a "'fair balance"'
of information about prescription drugs.297 Similarly, Justice Breyer would
have found that § 4631 directly advanced Vermont's interest in maintaining
the confidentiality of physicians' prescribing patterns, a norm already
embodied in Vermont's Pharmacy Rules. 2 98 The fact that the statute
permitted physicians themselves to control whether their prescribing
histories could be used for marketing purposes "seem[ed] sufficiently to
292. Id at 2679.
293. Id.; see also id. at 2685 (stating that, "At best the Court opens a Pandora's Box of
First Amendment challenges to many ordinary regulatory practices that may only
incidentally affect a commercial message. . . .At worst, it reawakens Lochner's pre-New
Deal threat of substituting judicial for democratic decisionmaking where ordinary economic
regulation is at issue.").
294. Id. at 2679.
295. Id at 2681-82 (citing Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S.
707, 719 (1985); Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749,
762-71 (1989)).
296. Id at 2682.
297. Id at 2682-83.
298. Id. at 2683.
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show that [§ 4631] serve(d] a meaningful interest in increasing the
protection given to prescriber privacy." 2 99
Finally, Justice Breyer explained why Vermont's chosen option
constituted the least restrictive regulation to achieve the state's tri-partite
aim.300 Encouraging physicians to refuse to speak with detailers arguably
would have no effect on health care costs, nor would it prevent data miners
and pharmaceutical companies from infringing on prescribers' privacy by
obtaining their identifiable information.3 0' Paradoxically, "[fjorcing doctors
to choose between targeted detailing and no detailing at all could [ ]
jeopardize the [s]tate's interest in promoting public health," since some
physicians did perceive a benefit to the information delivered by
pharmaceutical representatives.302 As for the majority's suggestion that
Vermont could have allowed disclosure of PI data only under a limited
range of circumstances, Justice Breyer maintained that the exceptions
defined under § 4631(e) were narrow and that further restrictions would
actually impose a heightened burden on speech.303
VI. PRIVACY AND PRESCRIBER-IDENTIFIABLE DATA AFTER SORRELL
A.

Privacy

Although the Sorrell Court did not explicitly state that there may be a
right of privacy in PI data, it did intimate that data mining practiceS304
potentially implicate privacy interests in either of two ways: (1) data mining
could result in re-identification of confidential patient information 305 or (2)
data mining may compromise the privacy of providers' personal
299. Id. (citing Bd of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)
(noting that First Amendment commercial speech jurisprudence requires "a fit that is not
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the singlc bcst disposition
but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served" (internal quotation marks
omitted); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 434 (1993) (stating that First
Amendment does not "require that the Government make progress on every front before it
can make progress on any front")).
300. Id. at 2683-84.
301. Id at 2683.
302. Id
303. Id. at 2684.
304. See Andis Kaulins, Medical Prescription Data Mining Case Decided by US
Supreme Court in Favor of PharmaceuticalIndustry as Corporate Free Speech: Sorrell v.
IMS Health, LAW PUNDIT (June 27, 2011, 3:08 AM), http://lawpundit.blogspot.com/2011/06
/medical-prescription-data-mining-case.html (stating that "the majority opinion did hint,
briefly, at the possibility that new computer-based methods of gathering and sorting
information - such as the process known as [']data-mining['] - present [']serious and
unresolved issues with respect to personal privacy and the dignity it seeks to secure.[']").
305.

Latanya Sweeney, Sorrell (Vermont) v. IMS Health Inc., DATA PRIVACY LAB,

http://dataprivacylab.org/people/sweeney/new.html (June 2010).
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information.30 6 While the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIPAA) provides that patients have clearly defined privacy
protections with respect to the collection and dissemination of confidential
medical information, such as their prescription histories, there are no clear
protections for physician prescribing information except pursuant to state
law - the type of law that Vermont attempted to enact.
Some commentators argue that Sorrell is not about privacy at all.3 o7 As
the Court noted, while Vermont claimed that the law was intended to
prevent the disclosure of private patient information, the actual language of
the statute allowed the disclosure of the collected data to anyone but
pharmaceutical companies. 30 s Thus, the only privacy safeguard afforded
under the Vermont statute was protection from pharmaceutical companies not from anyone else who requests the data. 30 9 The majority accordingly left
open the possibility that a statute designed to maintain the privacy of PI
data by preventing disclosure under all or most circumstances might survive
heightened constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, the Sorrell Court did not directly
address whether physicians have a right of privacy in their prescribing
information. Rather, it held that even if such a privacy interest exists, it
would have failed as a justification for enacting § 4631(d) because the
Vermont statute allowed the disclosure of the information for other
purposes.31 o Had Vermont truly attempted to protect prescribing
information, exempting only a few limited uses (such as for educational
research), the Court intimated that law might have been upheld.31 1
Other commentators argue that, as a practical matter, privacy is not a
legitimate concern, since it would be difficult to re-identify de-identified
data. 3 12 On one hand, it is speculated that it takes complex algorithms to
find similarities between two data sets such that even if one took the time
and effort to identify some of the patients, only a few re-identifications
would ultimately prove accurate.313 Yet there are those who argue that "re-

306. See Cheryl Hanna & Pamela Vesilind, Supreme Court Doesn't Look Favorably on
Vermont's David v. Goliath Style Arguments, VT DIGGER.ORG (June 23, 2011, 11:04 PM),
http://vtdigger.org/2011/06/23/hanna-and-vesilind-supreme-court-doesnE2%80%99t-lookfavorably-on-vermont%E2%80%99s-david-v-goliath-style-arguments/.
307. See Jim Harper, Sorrell vs. IMS Health: Not a PrivacyCase, CATO@LIBERTY (June
24, 2011, 8:37 AM), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/sorrell-vs-ims-health-not-a-privacycase/.
308. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668.
309. See id.
310. Id. at 2669.
311. See id. at 2668.
312. Jane Yakowitz & Daniel Barth-Jones, The Illusory Privacy Problem in Sorrell v.
IMS Health, TECHNOLOGY POLICY INSTITUTE, 4-5 (May 2011), http://www.techpolicy
institute.org/files/the%20illusory%20privacy%20problem%20in%20sorrelll .pdf.
313. See Yakowitz & Barth-Jones, supra note 312.
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identifying" or "de-anonymizing" data is a relatively easy task. 14 Paul
Ohm, Associate Professor at the University of Colorado Law School,
suggests that if the data that pharmacies sell to the pharmaceutical
companies contain enough information for mining specialists to re-identify
it, the potential privacy implications of the Court's decision in Sorrell could
be highly concerning for any patient who fills a prescription at a pharmacy
that sells its PI records to data vendors. 3 15
The Sorrell Court also hinted that a state statute allowing an "opt-out"
provision for physicians might be more likely to survive heightened
scrutiny, since Vermont's "opt-in" system primarily advanced the state's
interest in discouraging a particular kind of speech.3 16 That is, even if the
physicians did not "opt in," their data would still be shared with the entities
permitted by the Vermont statute. Therefore, the Court held that the "optin" provision violated First Amendment protections enjoyed by pharmacies
and pharmaceutical manufacturers as well as others.317 The alternative "optout" provision would neither favor nor disfavor speech, though Justice
Kennedy expressed doubt that even the opt-out provision would have saved
the Vermont statute under the Court's heightened scrutiny.
B.

Speech Implications

A commentator writing for The Incidental Economist suggests that an
unintended consequence of the Sorrell decision might be that it weakens the
protections against promotion of off-label prescriptions because that type of
commercial speech, like the speech facilitated by data mining, now enjoys
strong First Amendment protection.318 In any event, Sorrell supports the
ability of pharmaceutical companies to utilize whatever data they can
acquire for targeted marketing 31 9 by limiting the restrictions that states can
impose on the use of that data. At the same time, however, the Court
suggested that states might overcome the heightened scrutiny by enacting
stronger privacy protections by means of legislation designed to protect

314. See generally Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the
SurprisingFailureofAnonymization, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1701 (2010).
315. But cf id at 1723 (showing that some de-identified data is, nonetheless, uniquely
identifiable).
316. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2669.
317. Id. See also Nicole Friess, Supreme Court Pro-Business and First Amendment Targeted Regulations in Trouble, INFORMATION LAW GROUP (June 28, 2011),
http://www.infolawgroup.com/2011/06/articles/lawsuit/supreme-court-probusiness-and-firstamendment-targeted-regulations-in-trouble/.

318. See Kevin Outterson, Sorrell v. IMS Health, 6-3 for the Companies, THE
INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (June 23, 2011, 12:08 PM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/
wordpress/sorrell-v-ims-health-6-3-for-the-companies/.
319. See Hanna & Vesilind, supra note 302.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2012

41

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 21 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 7

Annals of Health Law

488

[Vol. 21

substantial privacy interests.320
The Sorrell Court determined that "the creation and dissemination of
information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment." 32 1 yet
the information at issue neither came from the public domain nor re-enters
the public domain after it is used.322 As Professor Sean Flynn from
American University Washington College of Law opines, "[t]he First
Amendment's interests in promoting a marketplace of ideas and facilitating
democratic decision making through the free flow of public information are
not furthered by protecting from regulation the private commercial trade of
private information in medical records."323 Indeed, physicians and patients
do not volunteer prescription information to the public, and data vendors do
not give the information they acquire to the public.324 Rather, the
information is used solely for the purpose of their own economic gain.325
Indeed, it is speech intended only for the pharmaceutical companies and
detailers who target physicians for promotion. Under Sorrell, once any data
exists, however acquired, its future dissemination is protected by the First
Amendment regardless of the benefit or detriment to the public interest.
Sorrell likened the limitation on "speech" under § 4631(d) to "prohibiting
trade magazines from purchasing or using ink,"3 26 suggesting that "speech"
is so fundamental to pharmaceutical detailing that data miners' business
could not exist in its absence. Of course, detailing is not dependent upon
use of PI data.327
C.

Amending Vermont's PrescriptionConfidentialityLaw

The Sorrell Court offered concrete suggestions for how Vermont might
address the defects of its Prescription Confidentiality Law.328 One would be
to enact a provision that amounts to a state-law extension of HIPAA,
making PI data another category of protected health information. 3 29 Rather
320. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667-69.
321. Id. at 2667.
322. Will Supreme Court Decision In Sorrell V. IMS Tie States' Hands In Medical
Records Privacy Efforts?, NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE ASSOCIATION ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG
PRICES (June 24, 2011), http://www.reducedrugprices.org/read.asp?news=6207.
323. Sean Fiil-Flynn, PIJIP Professor Sean Flynn Responds to Supreme Court Decision
in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., PUP AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW

(June 23, 2011), http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/pijip-professor-sean-flynnresponds-to-supreme-court-decision-in-sorrell-v-ims-health-inc.
324. Fiil-Flynn, supra note 323.
325. Fiil-Flynn, supra note 323.
326. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667. See also Friess, supra note 317.
327. See Curfman, supra note 17, at 2053-54 (defining detailing as the use and sale of
de-identified data).
328. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668.
329. See Fiil-Flynn,supra note 323.
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than permitting disclosure of PI data for any purpose other than marketing,
the statute would generally prohibit disclosure and identify narrowly
tailored circumstances under which disclosure would be permitted. 3 30 For
instance, the statute might prohibit all use of PI data except for uses
intended for educational and medical research or medical quality
assurance. 3 3 1 Alternatively, Vermont could impose basic standards for deidentification of the data.332 This would differ from the patient medical data
standards already established in that patient privacy laws and regulations
could apply not only to the patient information, but to the de-identification
of provider information as well. Yet another option would be for Vermont
to prohibit data mining altogether using a contractual approach. Vermont is
one of the few states with a single-payer healthcare system: Green
Mountain Care. Vermont could simply require that a provision be inserted
in all Green Mountain contracts with participating retail pharmacies 33 3
prohibiting the sale of PI data. Thus, Vermont could impose an
administrative requirement that, as a condition of doing business with
Green Mountain Care, pharmacies may not sell aggregated PI data for any
purpose. A variation on that theme might be that Vermont could decide that
pharmacies must maintain the data as a "state-mandated record,"334
meaning the data would be protected as long as it is not already "in private
hands."33 5
Finally, a non-legislative alternative might be to implement educational
campaigns to empower physicians and the public to assume control of their
336
medical privacy and take measures to enforce the existing restrictions.
For instance, Vermont could mount a public service campaign to raise
awareness of the issues concerning PI data, educating the public as well as
physicians about its nature and the right of physicians to refuse to meet with
pharmaceutical representatives.
D.

Will the Maine and New HampshireStatutes Survive Sorrell?

One major difference between the Maine and Vermont statutes is that
Maine's law contains language asserting that the statute was crafted in a
"narrowly and carefully tailored" manner to "advance the State's
330. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668.
331. But cf id. at 2660, 2668 (suggesting that if "narrow and well-justified," a statute
permitting only limited uses may prevail).
332. Berin Szoka, After Sorrell v. IMS Health: Reconciling Free Speech with Privacy
Protections, TECHNOLOGY LIBERATION FRONT (June 24, 2011), http://techliberation.com/
2011/06/24/after-sorrell-v-ims-health-reconciling-free-speech-with-privacy-protections/.
333. Outterson, supra note 318.
334. Outterson, supra note 318.
335. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2657.
336. Szoka, supra note 332.
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compelling interests.""' While incorporation of such language will not, in
itself, save the statute, the fact that Maine's law allows physicians to "opt
out" rather than "opt in" to use of their PI data might suffice. 3 That is,
under Maine's law, restrictions on using the information for marketing only
exist after a physician has opted not to permit such use of her personal data.
Whether this is enough to survive under Sorrell is unclear. Once the
"intermediary" has the information, and the physician has not opted out of
the exchange, the "intermediary" has free reign to use the information as
desired. 33 9 Thus, the restriction, while limited to "intermediaries," does not
go into effect unless the physician opts out. Additionally, there is no
content-based restriction as long as the physician has not opted out. This is
an example of a much more targeted law with more limited control over the
dissemination of the information that the Court suggested might prevail.
As to the New Hampshire statute, the major difference between it and the
Vermont law is that New Hampshire prohibits the use of PI data for "any
commercial purpose," regardless of physician permission. 3 40 "Commercial
purpose" includes, but is not limited to, pharmaceutical marketing and
promotion.341 This constitutes a more comprehensive ban than that imposed
by Vermont's statute. It is therefore possible that New Hampshire's statute
may survive based on another of the Sorrell Court's suggestions that the
prohibitions be discrete and well-defined, or that the law prohibit the selling
of information altogether.342 Whether New Hampshire can establish that its
statute serves a substantial state interest remains to be determined. Sorrell
supports the assumption that physicians have "an interest in keeping their
prescription decisions confidential."34 3 In the wake of Sorrell, both the New
Hampshire and Maine laws could survive the required level of First
Amendment scrutiny.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court's determination in Sorrell that the data vendors' right to use

acquired data for economic gain trumps Vermont's interests in regulating
the sale and use of PI data might well have been different but for the
application of heightened First Amendment scrutiny. One explanation for
this heightened scrutiny is that the Court sought to expand the constitutional

337.
338.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 171 1-E(1-B)(C) (2008).
Id §1711-E (2-A).

339. But cf id. (providing that the statute only proscribes "intermediary" use when the
prescriber has "filed for confidentiality protection").
340. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 318:47-4 (2006); Id. §318-B:12 (IV).
341. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318:47-4 (2006); Id. §318-B:12 (IV).
342. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2672.
343.

Id. at 2668.
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protections to which corporations and other businesses are entitled.3 "
However, that goal is at odds with the Court's offer of numerous
suggestions to address the statutory ills. Perhaps the Sorrell decision was
intended to send a strong message to other states that they must carefully
craft their data mining statutes to protect privacy without singling out a
particular industry. Similarly situated states such as Maine, New
Hampshire, and others can now look to Sorrell to amend their laws in ways
that will withstand the heightened First Amendment scrutiny applied by the
Court.

344. David H. Gans, Sorrell v. IMS Health: CorporateCommercial Speech in the Age of
Citizens United,THEUSCONSTITUTION.ORG (June 24, 2011), http://theusconstitution.org
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